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Fifty Years of Securities Regulation
in Search of a Purpose
HOMER KRIPKE*
For slightly more than half a century the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) has been charged with the duty of reg-
ulating disclosure. This article examines the SEC's purposes in
formulating disclosure requirements throughout the past fifty
years, the SEC's disciplinary measures for violations, and the
SEC's recently proposed legislation prohibiting insider trading on
nonpublic information. The author believes that although the SEC
exceeded its proper authority in the area of disciplinary measures
in the 1970's, much of the overreaching has subsided. The author
concludes that the proposed legislation is still too indefinite to
meet the legitimate needs of the financial community.
The year 1983 marked the 50th anniversary of the Securities Act
of 1933, which coincided closely with the time of my attendance at
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the 50th reunion of my law class at the University of Michigan. This
happened, of course, because the famous first hundred days of the
Roosevelt Administration (during which the Securities Act was en-
acted) corresponded roughly with my last hundred days in law
school.
By a fortuitous incident I became involved with the Securities Act
very soon after my graduation and I have followed the securities leg-
islation closely through most of these fifty years. During my period
of service at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), I be-
came interested and involved in legal-accounting matters and in the
meaning of accounting for legal, regulatory, and investment decision
purposes.1 Subsequently, I came to believe that the Commission has
not adequately modified its approach to accounting and financial dis-
closure to reflect the change from a deflationary to an inflationary
economy and to reflect increased analytic and economic understand-
ing of the working of the markets. While there have been. improve-
ments, they are not yet sufficient. My concern is reflected in Part I
of this article.
I was a minor Roosevelt New Dealer during my period of service
at the SEC, which was roughly during its fifth to tenth years. I re-
main sympathetic to the role of government in the economy and the
society. However, I think that government tended to go too far in the
1970's and the SEC was an example of this tendency. This view is
reflected in Part II.
I do not intend in this article to deal with securities regulatory
problems at a technical level. Rather, I intend to use the SEC as an
example of broader issues which have been presented in administra-
tive law and the role of government over the last fifty years. The
SEC is a fair example because it is generally conceded that the SEC
has been among the best, if not the best, of the federal administra-
tive agencies throughout its entire life. Its staff has retained a high
level of competence, integrity, and assiduous performance of its
duties.
Part of the reason for the SEC's excellent reputation is that it has
done a very satisfactory job of limiting gross securities fraud, not-
withstanding occasional egregious failures such as Equity Funding.
2
Its excellent success in this respect leads some to believe that it is
equally successful in its regulatory activities and in aiding investors
in their investment activities. However, for at least fifteen years
there has been a second school of thought to the effect that the SEC
1. See Kripke, Accountants' Financial Statements and Fact-Finding in the Law of
Corporate Regulation, 50 YALE L.J. 1180 (1941), and 72 J. AccT. 201 (1941); Kripke,
A Case Study in the Relationship of Law and Accounting: Uniform Accounts 100.5 and
107, (pts. 1-2), 57 HARV. L. REV. 433 (1944), 57 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1944).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 102-106.
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has not been wise or efficient in the latter respects, and that it has
reached beyond its proper sphere of activities.
In this article, I will not attempt to appraise the SEC's regulatory
activities. Professor Walter Werner, in two strong articles,4 con-
tended that the SEC had deliberately disabled itself from maintain-
ing the economic competence necessary for effective regulation, had
failed to regulate effectively in two important fields, and had pre-
ferred to take a purely legal approach, assuming the role of the
scourge of evil-doers, thus emphasizing its antifraud approach.' In-
deed, a former commissioner, Roberta S. Karmel, wrote a book, the
title of which reflects her belief that the SEC's regulatory and even
its disclosure activities have been skewed by its enforcement ap-
proach. The title of the book is Regulation by Prosecution.6
Even spokespersons for the Commission concede that the Commis-
sion was unaware of the extent to which stock exchanges had diluted
their net capital requirements for the brokerage industry in the late
1960's. The Commission relied on the stock exchanges in lieu of ap-
plying its own requirements. This reliance was responsible in part for
the almost calamitous "back office" collapse of the early 1970's. 7
A recent book reviews the history of the SEC's efforts to force the
stock exchanges to abandon fixed commissions, and concludes that
the agency was culpable in delaying the accomplishment of that re-
sult.8 The book also reviews the agency's efforts to establish the na-
tional market mandated by Congress and again finds delay and lack
3. See R.S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION (1982); Anderson, The Dis-
closure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311
(1974); Mann, Prospectuses: Unreadable or Just Unread? - A Proposal to Reexamine
Policies Against Permitting Projections, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 222 (1971); Morton &
Booker, The Paradoxical Nature of Federal Securities Regulations, 44 DEN. L.J. 479
(1967); Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
254 (1972); Kripke, infra notes 27, 55, 60, 63, 67, 80, 103; H. KRIPKE, infra note 25.
4. Werner, Protecting the Mutual Fund Investor: The SEC Reports on the SEC,
68 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1968); Werner, Adventure in Social Control of Finance: The
National Market System for Securities, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1233 (1975).
5. More recently the Commission has attempted a resurrection of its economic
competence by creating an Economic Directorate. In my opinion, the studies emanating
from that organization have been essentially statistical studies with little in the way of
economic judgment that might be helpful in determining regulatory or disclosure policy.
Of course, I have no way of knowing what role the Economic Directorate plays in the
determination of Commission policy in camera.
6. R.S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION (1982).
7. SEC, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICE OF BROKERS AND DEALERS
- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SEC, H.R. Doc. No. 231, 92nd Cong., 2d
Sess. 63-65, 101 (1971); H. BARUCH, WALL.STREET: SECURITY RISK, ch. 10 (1971); J.
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, 450-66 (1982).
8. See J. SELIGMAN, supra note 7 at 382-416, 466-86.
of drive.' Others have criticized the Commission's requirements for
disclosure from the point of view of usefulness. 10
A convenient way to examine whether the SEC has, in an overall
view, served its purposes wisely and efficiently is to consider what its
purposes were. Here we find considerable ambiguity and subtle shifts
of position. Hence, the title of this article.
This article focuses on two areas: (1) the purposes of fifty years of
disclosure requirements; and (2) the purposes behind the SEC's
overreaching in the 1970's in the administration of the disclosure
rules and the antifraud prohibitions.
PART I: ADMINISTRATION OF DISCLOSURE:
THE PURPOSES OF THE DISCLOSURE SYSTEM
PURPOSE ONE: Getting the markets working.
A good way to begin this discussion is with a pioneer article by
Morton and Booker that is too little known: The Paradoxical Nature
of Federal Securities Regulations."' The authors' thesis is that the
real purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 was to restore public con-
fidence in the securities markets to lift the country out of depres-
sion.1 2 Morton and Booker believe that the "peccadillos" or frauds in
the securities markets in the period before the Great Crash of 1929
were no worse than those of prior periods; however, more persons
and classes of society were hurt by the Great Crash than in prior
periods because more people had been speculating. The authors be-
lieve that Congress' real purpose in passing the Securities Act was
getting the markets working to finance business, but the Act was
sold to the public under the more attractive guise of protecting the
individual investor by preventing fraud. Eventually, the SEC began
to believe its own publicity and started to concentrate on the anti-
fraud function, even at the expense of the flow of capital."3
9. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 7, at 486-534.
10. Anderson, supra note 3; Mann, supra note 3; Schneider, supra note 3; Kripke,
infra notes 27, 55, 60, 63, 67, 80, 103.
11. Morton & Booker, supra note 3.
12. The Morton and Booker view, supra note 3 at 482, corresponds closely with
that of the SEC's Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure in its Report:
It is fair to conclude, based on the discussion of the background to the adoption
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts contained in Chapter XIX of this Report, that the
ultimate objective of these statutes was to rebuild this country's economy by
facilitating the raising of capital. This was to be done through a restoration of
the confidence of investors in the integrity of the capital markets. Disclosure
would restore confidence by equalizing access to information, thereby starting
everyone at the same place in the competition to find the best investment. Dis-
closure would, at the same time, hinder fraud and improve the morals of the
market place without explicit and direct governmental regulation.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, infra note 48, at 308.
13. Morton & Booker, supra note 3, at 481-83. Compare a remark by one who at
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The SEC undoubtedly came to believe its own rhetoric. Professor
Alison J. Anderson examined the question of its purposes in her
1974 article, 14 and found that the legislative history and early SEC
history are unclear as to the purpose of disclosure mandated by Con-
gress in the securities legislation. She discussed two possible
purposes:
PURPOSE Two: Protecting investors against fraud and other abuses
in the securities markets;
PURPOSE THREE: Providing useful information to assist investors in
making buy, sell, and hold decisions in securities.
Professor Anderson at times refers to these as "the protective
function" and "the informational function" respectively.1 5 For a long
time I thought Professor Anderson's dichotomy was probably
strained, and that the obvious answer was that the mandated disclos-
ure had both the protective and the informational purposes to some
extent. One simple explanation for the relatively slight effort in the
early years to make disclosure more informative and useful could be
that securities analysis was in its infancy at the beginning of securi-
ties regulation. Indeed, the first edition of the seminal book on fun-
damental security analysis, by Graham and Dodd, was not published
until 1934.18
After further thought, I now believe that Professor Anderson's
thesis is correct. Much of the disturbing history of the SEC's role in
the time of writing was the SEC's chief appellate litigator: "Since I believe Congress was
attempting to improve the morality of the marketplace, I think that the economic effect
is largely irrelevant. . . ." Ferber, The Case Against Insider Trading: A Response to
Professor Manne, 23 VAND. L. REv. 621, 622 (1970).
14. Anderson, supra note 3, passim.
15. At one point, Professor Anderson describes the informational function some-
what differently: "[Tie promote efficient allocation of capital resources through well-in-
formed securities markets. . . ." Anderson, supra note 3, at 323. Only at this point does
she throw the emphasis on the public concern with efficient capital markets rather than
on individual investors' concern with securities selection. At this single point she ap-
proaches Morton and Booker's PURPOSE ONE.
16. B. GRAHAM & D. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS (1934). The final edition was B.
GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS (4th ed., 1962). A popularized
version of this, work, published in several editions, was B. GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT
INVESTOR. The SEC's view of its informational function (PURPOSE THREE) during most
of its history was congruent with the theories of fundamental analysis pioneered and
exemplified by these books. It is interesting that Ben Graham's view in an interview
shortly before his death was that the then current goal of "performance" had departed
from his ideas of fundamental analysis and left the market more unpredictable. Mosko-
witz, The 'Intelligent Investor' at 80, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1974, § 3, at 7, col. 1.
mandated disclosure can be explained by its emphasis on disclosure
as an aid to enforcement of the antifraud laws (PURPOSE Two),
rather than any intent to assist affirmatively in securities selection or
to strengthen the capital markets (PURPOSES ONE and THREE).
PURPOSE FOUR: Performing functions in a way that will avoid
criticism.
PURPOSE FOUR is not unique to the SEC; it is endemic to every
bureaucratic organization, public or private. In the SEC, the feared
criticism might come from investors who lost money because they
relied on a disclosure document required by the SEC and from con-
gressmen who might take some heat from such investors.
As one who has known many commissioners and staff members of
the SEC I cannot doubt their sincerity, integrity, and good faith.
Were it not for this, it would be hard to believe that before the early
1970's the SEC took PURPOSE THREE seriously, that is, the assertion
that its purpose was to give effect to
the philosophy underlying the act, that a disclosure law would provide the
best protection for investors. In other words, if the investor had available to
him all the material facts concerning a security, he would then be in a
position to make an informed judgment whether or not to buy.
17
Ray Garrett, Jr. had an explanation of the Commission's emphasis
during its first four decades on historical accounting reports. In
1976, shortly after he had resigned as chairman of the Commission,
he stated:
There is an implicit fundamentalist's faith in the approach of the [Securi-
ties Act forms]. Investors make investment decisions primarily by extrapo-
lation from a company's past experience accurately portrayed. I certainly
do not know, and I am reasonably confident that the Commission collec-
tively does not know, the extent to which this is statistically true. 8
To support the Commission's approach as thus described one
could quote J. M. Keynes:
It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight to
matters which are very uncertain. It is reasonable, therefore, to be guided
to a considerable degree by the facts about which we may feel somewhat
confident, even though they may be less decisively relevant to the issue than
the other facts about which our knowledge is vague and scanty ... our
usual practice being to take the existing situation and to project it into the
future, modified only to the extent that we have more or less definite reason
for expecting a change .
The outstanding fact is the extreme precariousness of the basis of knowl-
edge on which our estimates of prospective yield have to be made .... 1
17. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5,223 (Jan. 11, 1972), Notice of Adoption of
Rule 144, reprinted in [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 78,487.
18. Lecture by Ray Garrett, Jr., Revisiting Disclosure - Once More, U.C.S.D.
Third Annual Securities Law Institute (Jan. 14, 1976).
19. J.M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY, ch. 12, pt. 11 (1936).
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As Keynes indicates, recognition that the future may not be like the
past still leaves one needing a working rule. The assumption that the
future will be like the past may be useful, as a rule of thumb, unless
we know otherwise. Such thinking, however, cannot justify the Com-
mission's completely rigid opposition for nearly forty" years to any
estimation of the future. In shutting out any effort to project the
future, the Commission was not making a judgment of relevance
under PURPOSE THREE, for investors clearly considered projections to
be relevant, and it was not the Commission's function to do the in-
vestors' thinking for them. Rather, it was operating under PURPOSE
FOUR, to protect itself against the possibility that it could not ade-
quately police discussions of the future and that such projections
might prove to be inaccurate.20
Garrett's statement conceals another problem. He refers to "past
experience accurately portrayed." 21 The most useful information fur-
nished by the SEC documents is financial information because it can
be structured and made comparable. The most useful financial infor-
mation which the SEC could supply consistent with its antifraud and
self-protective purposes (PURPOSES Two and FOUR) has been ac-
counting information. However, this begs the question of whether
standard accounting information is "past experience accurately
portrayed."
Accounting, while it was not new in the early 1930's, was still a
jungle. No one had the authority to promulgate general practices or
principles for issuers of securities and accountants to follow. A pro-
cess of this nature began in 1932, the year before the adoption of the
Securities Act, when the New York Stock Exchange and the Ameri-
can Institute of Accountants (now the AICPA) agreed on a program
for adopting accounting principles. The AICPA adopted its first
rules at a general meeting in 1934.22
Improvement of accounting is not an easy task. Accounting is not
found in nature and is not derived from the laws of nature. It is a set
of concepts existing by convention and agreement, yet it remains the
heart of securities disclosure. The SEC at first sought to tame this
20. Former Commissioner Loomis, while he was General Counsel, made this point
explicit in 1968: "We don't want [projections] going out under our auspices." PRACTIS-
ING LAW INSTITUTE, NEW TRENDS AND SPECIAL PROBLEMS UNDER THE SECURITIES
LAws 300 (Transcript, 1970). See also DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 SECURITIES ACTS (The Wheat Re-
port), 95-96 (1969).
21. Garrett, supra note 18.
22. These are now embodied in ARB No. 43, ch. 1, § A (1953).
jungle by obtaining the cooperation of the AICPA, but the AICPA
refused to cooperate because it did not approve of government regu-
lation of the accounting profession. 23 After a few years the SEC ca-
pitulated and told the accountants, in effect, that if they would get
on with the job of adopting accounting principles and striving toward
uniformity, the SEC would allow them to do so. 24 Thus, the SEC has
delegated to the accountants, without any statutory authority for
such delegation, the most important part of its disclosure job. This
delegation is in contrast to the express statutory authority given for
delegation to other self-regulatory bodies, such as the stock ex-
changes, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.
As business and financing arrangements have become more com-
plex over the years, the SEC has increasingly left accounting matters
to the accountants. It has frequently argued that it does not have the
personpower to make the studies and to exercise the supervision nec-
essary to regulate accounting effectively. It also contends that it has
23. The story is told in R. CHATOV, CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING: PUBLIC
OR PRIVATE CONTROL (1975).
24. The symbol of this SEC position is ASR No. 4, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,913 (1938). It
was restated on the occasion of the creation of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board in ASR No. 150, 38 Fed. Reg. 1,260 (1973). These positions are now codified in
SEC CFRP 1 101, reprinted in 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,921.
The latest SEC justification for this position is by then-Commissioner Bevis Longstreth
in The Sec's Role in Financial Disclosure, 7 J. ACCT., AUDITING, & FIN. 110, 116, 118
(1984):
Some are critical of the Commission's failure to assert a more formal role in
the accounting standards-setting process. Professor Homer Kripke, for example,
describes the accounting area as the Commission's biggest failure. Professor Joel
Seligman voiced similar concerns in his recent book. Professor Kripke argues
that 'accounting principles have to be set jointly by the private profession and
the Commission.' He describes the current process as-an 'uneasy cooperation
caused by the Commission's unwise exclusion of itself from an avowed role in
the process and the guerrilla warfare it therefore has to wage to influence the
process.'
I disagree with Professor Kripke. Under the Commission's current procedures,
accounting principles are, in fact, set jointly by the profession and the SEC. The
process is not exactly as Professor Kripke would fashion it. There is a productive
tension between the Commission and the FASB, resulting from the Commis-
sion's oversight efforts. What is "guerilla warfare" to Professor Kripke was the
'prodding, guidance, and review necessary to ensure the profession meets its
challenges' to former SEC Chairman Harold Williams. The Wheat study group
on establishment of accounting principles called it a 'continuing dynamic
relationship.'
Through a constant exchange of views with the FASB, the Chief Accountant,
and through him, the Commission, is kept current on all significant accounting
developments.
This informal process of oversight creates numerous opportunities for the
Commission to affect not only the approach to be taken by the FASB with re-
spect to various issues but the agenda of issues to be considered.
But what is the significance of the FASB's vaunted due process or the Commission's
compliance with its own administrative rule-making due process requirements when the
Commission is able to "affect" the FASB by the "informal" back door?
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not given up its control, but operates in a supervisory capacity.
The question of using historical cost or current market value of
assets shown in financial statements is the basic issue in account-
ing.25 Initially the Commission's emphasis on cost may have been
justified because during the Depression, when securities regulation
was born, issuers wrote down their assets below cost. This was done
on a real or purported value basis, to reduce depreciation and other
exhaustion charges, and thus to boost the issuer's income. But the
SEC persisted in its position long after the Depression was over, even
though adherence to historical costs bolstered income by keeping ex-
haustion charges below what they would have been if those charges
had reflected the current replacement costs or another basis of recog-
nizing values.26 Admittedly, the SEC did not encounter any resis-
tance from the accounting profession on this point. The accountants,
partly on principle and partly because of risks of liability, have
shown a preference for the objective historical cost system over any
other kind of value system. This position of the accountants still per-
sists under FAS 33 (1979), which retains the historical cost system
and treats disclosure of current costs as supplementary information,
outside the principal financial statements and thus outside the audi-
tor's opinion.
25. G.O. MAY, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 86 (1943). For an account of the forma-
tion of the Commission's position, see H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOS-
URE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE, ch. 17 (1979).
26. Frequently the result is that when the property is sold and a new larger cost
recognized by the new owner, the increased depreciation charge reduces the new owner's
income to the point that he loses the advantage of the acquisition. This applies in
"purchase accounting," even when the new larger cost is determined by the market value
of the stock issued in exchange. Alternatively, under the concept of "pooling," in the case
of an acquisition for stock consideration, this result is avoided by retaining the former
owner's costs and balancing the transaction by using lower dollar figures for the ac-
quirer's stock issuance. The accounting authorities have sought to justify "pooling" by
drawing metaphysical distinctions between it and "purchase accounting." See ARB No.
48 (1957); APB Opinion No. 16 (1970); cf. FASB Discussion Memorandum, An Analy-
sis of Issues Related to Accounting for Business Combinations and Purchased Intangibles
(Aug. 19, 1976). I have contended that the real purpose of pooling is to avoid a disrup-
tion of the basis for depreciation caused by a transfer which requires recognition of a
new cost, a disruption which would be avoided if the basis for depreciation was periodi-
cally adjusted on a value basis. See G.R. CATLETT & N.O. OLSON, ACCOUNTING FOR
GOODWILL 122 (1968) (comments of Homer Kripke) (AICPA Research Study No. 10);
Kripke, Accounting for Corporate Acquisitions and the Treatment of Goodwill: An
Alert Signal to All Business Lawyers, 24 Bus. LAW 89 (1968); T.J. FIFIs & H.
KRIPKE, ACCOUNTING FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS 605-22 (2d ed. 1977).
Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information and Estimates
Similarly, the SEC long forbade, even outside the financial state-
ments, any estimates of value or forecasts of earnings from which
estimates of value might have been deduced. The SEC feared that
opening the door to estimates of value or earnings could unleash the
potential for fraud (PURPOSE Two) because such estimates could not
be policed by the SEC, thus leaving it vulnerable to criticism (PUR-
POSE FOUR). It denied forecast and estimate information even to so-
phisticated professionals for fear that someone might be unwary and
be deceived. The SEC also forbade disclosure of any other "soft
information" which it could not objectively verify.28
Cash flow information was also not permitted to be supplied to
readers of financial statements for fear that this information might
be confused with accrual accounting disclosures and thus open the
door to fraud.29 Cash flow had long been the basis on which invest-
ments in real estate securities were considered and it was important
in many other respects.3 Management accounting, as distinguished
from financial accounting, rests more on a cash flow basis than an
accrual accounting basis. Yet the SEC specifically denied permission
for cash flow disclosure, even as a supplement to accrual accounting,
until accountants themselves began emphasizing the importance of
cash flow. 31 Since then, having learned from the accountants, the
SEC has begun emphasizing in Regulation S-K, Item 303(a), In-
struction 2,32 the importance of estimating cash flow, its risks, and
27. Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1188-1201 (1970); Schneider, supra note 3, passim.
28. Schneider, supra note 3, passim.
29. Franchard Corporation, 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964); ASR 142 (1973), now CFRP
11 202-202.02, reprinted in 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 72,961, 72,962 (former, SEC
Guide 60 for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5,692 (Mar. 17, 1976), reprinted in [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,405).
30. To some extent this rigid exclusion became less damaging when the account-
ants added a fourth principal financial statement to the u~ual three, namely, a Statement
of Changes in Financial Condition. See APB Opinion No. 19 (1971). Even that, how-
ever, did not clearly focus on cash flow for many years, but focused on working capital,
an imprecise concept which could obscure cash flow. See L. HEATH, FINANCIAL REPORT-
ING AND THE EVALUATION OF INSOLVENCY (1978) (AICPA Accounting Research Mono-
graph No. 3). It has been only in the last two years, propelled by the FASB's proposal to
change the emphasis toward a Statement of Cash Flows, that accountants have begun to
redirect the Statement of Changes in Financial Condition from analyzing changes in
working capital to analyzing changes in cash. See FASB Exposure Draft on Reporting
Income, Cash Flows and Financial Position of Business Enterprises, 1 36 (Nov. 16,
1981); FASB Exposure Draft on Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements
of Business Enterprises, 11T 28-30 (Dec. 30, 1983).
31. FASB, FAS No. 1 1 37-38, 43-44 (1978); FASB Exposure Draft on Report-
ing Income, Cash Flows and Financial Position of Business Enterprises, 11 27-28, 36
(Nov. 16, 1981).
32. Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (Instruction 2) (1983). The FASB's lastest
statement reads:
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the timing thereof. While both the SEC and the accounting profes-
sion assert that accrual accounting is more useful than cash-oriented
statements in estimating future cash flow, they have not demon-
strated the point.
it is hard to believe the Commission thought that financial disclos-
ure limited principally to historical cost accounting, with its rigid
rules for recognition of revenues, modeled the real world or supplied
the information on which investment decisions could be based. The
best that can be said is that (1) having delegated its control over
accounting to accountants,3 3 the Commission did not think deeply
about the meaning of accounting, the nature of investors' needs for
financial information, and the proper role of the SEC's mandated
disclosure to meet that need; and (2) accounting information with its
built-in conservatism was useful for the Commission's antifraud and
self-protective purposes (PURPOSES Two and FOUR).
One commentator, writing shortly after he left a top position in
the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance, suggested that the proper
function of mandated disclosure was to provide "facts," that is, ob-
jectively determinable information about the past to slow down the
decisional process through a mandatory waiting period, leaving the
decisional process in the hands of the investor and his broker.es
While the commentator's express assumption to justify his theory
was that the investor and broker would examine the "facts" in the
registration statement, he understood that they would consider the
[A] cash flow statement provides an incomplete basis for assessing prospects for
future cash flows because it cannot show interperiod relationships. Many current
cash receipts, especially from operations, stem from activities of earlier periods,
and many current cash payments are intended or expected to result in future,
not current, cash receipts. Statements of earnings and comprehensive income,
especially if used in conjunction with statements of financial position, usually
provide a better basis for assessing future cash flow prospects of an entity than
do cash flow statements alone.
FASB, Exposure Draft, Proposed Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts, Recogni-
tion and Measurement in Financial Statenients of Business Enterprises, Dec. 30, 1983 at
I 22b.
To prior statements of this the writer has answered: "In this the FASB is at least
partially right." H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 222 (1979). But, the writer argued that accrual accounting ig-
nores (and depreciation accounting in particular ignores) the disparate time values of
immediate and delayed cash flows. Id. at 224-27.
33. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24. See also H. KRIPKE, supra note 25,
pt. III.
34. Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16
Bus. LAW 300, 301-02, n. 6, 307-09 (1961). See also Mann, supra note 3, at 225-27;
Schneider, supra note 3 at 258-60.
very kind of material whose exclusion from the registration state-
ment he defended. In fact, he argued that this was their role.35
It would be tempting to designate this program of causing delay as
another purpose of the program. However, this theory certainly did
not conform to the Commission's pronouncements about its role, or
its sense of its own value and importance. But I believe that when
this comment was written in 1961, and for the next dozen years, it
correctly expressed what was actually happening in the new and
more vigorous post-Eisenhower era.
I therefore conclude that the dominant purposes of the Commis-
sion in disclosure during its first forty years, until the 1970's, were
PURPOSE Two - prevention of fraud (aided by rigid conservatism
and refusal to permit optimistic statements), and PURPOSE FOUR
self-protection.
The SEC Recognizes the Real World in the 1970's
I have described the situation as it existed until the end of the
1960's. Several changes for the better occurred early in the 1970's.
First and foremost was the arrival of John C. Burton as Chief Ac-
countant. He was principally responsible for bringing SEC disclosure
into the real world. He provided the principal impetus for requiring
the recognition of current values and of inflation accounting through
ASR 190.36 The FASB took over the problem (with the SEC's con-
currence) by issuing its FAS 33 and subsequent ancillary state-
ments. 37 Under Burton, the SEC developed what is now the Man-
agement Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
35. Heller, supra note 34, at 307-11.
36. ASR 190 (1976).
37. FAS 33 (1979). A very recent study prepared for the FASB asserts: "State-
ment 33 earnings variables provide no incremental information over and above that al-
ready provided by historical cost earnings." W.H. BEAVER & W.R. LANDSMAN, INCRE-
MENTAL INFORMATION CONTENT OF STATEMENT 33 DISCLOSURES (1983) (FASB
research report) reprinted in part in Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, The Week in Review
(Dec. 9, 1983) at 1-2. This conclusion was reached because none of six variables in
Statement 33 explained changes in stock prices of the reporting companies better than
historical cost earnings. But the authors continue:
Other studies have found little or no interest by the analyst community in the
use of Statement 33 data. . . . Why do analysts show so little interest in State-
ment 33 data? The reason may be that the data are too complex and unfamiliar
to use. However, another reason is that the data provide little or no additional
information relative to that already used by analysts.
There are 2 conditions that could lead to different results than those reported
here: (1) The level of unanticipated inflation (and unanticipated changes in spe-
cific prices) could become sufficiently high to overcome the effect of measure-
ment errors. If unanticipated inflation is high enough, the potential information
content may dominate measurement errors. (2) The measurement errors in
Statement 33 data could be reduced.
Id.
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of Operations, required by Regulation S-K, Item 303.38 According to
this regulation, the firm's management must analyze the corporate
financial statements in terms of the liquidity of the company (includ-
ing cash flow), the available capital resources, and the extent to
which past financial statements are not likely to be indicative of the
future.3 9 Thus, the Management Discussion and Analysis necessarily
involves a management projection of what the future is going to be
like, at least in comparison to the past.4 0 Burton was a strong sup-
porter of disclosure of projections in Commission documents; it was
not by accident that the Commission in the 1970's abandoned its
long-maintained negative attitudes toward disclosure of projections.
The Commission's authorization and, indeed, asserted encourage-
ment of the use of projections in Commission documents in the
1970's41 admittedly has not been widely used; and could not have
been expected to be widely used, considering the staff's traditional
hostility to projections and its adherence to old patterns. These were
shown first by an unworkable first draft of the proposed authoriza-
tion for projections,42 and later in a battle by the Enforcement Divi-
sion of the SEC to place the burden of proving good faith on the
issuer who seeks to invoke the safe harbor provisions for use of for-
ward-looking information. These efforts, even though overruled, were
not likely to encourage anyone to volunteer projections. Nevertheless,
the struggle for the use of projections was the focal point in the suc-
cessful effort in the 1970's to loosen up the Commission's rigidly
stereotyped required disclosures and to let the issuer tell its story in
a meaningful way.
43
Despite these improvements, there is still a major question
whether the FASB's accounting principles, enforced by the SEC,
38. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1983).
39. See id. The Commission thus went beyond the simplicity of its "fundamental-
ist's faith" that the future would be like the past. See also Garrett, supra note 18; supra
text accompanying note 21.
40. The safe-harbor rules for forward-looking statements, Securities Act Rule 175
and Exchange Act Rule 3b-6, cover not only the authorization for projections, but also
statements of future economic performance in the Management Discussion and Analysis,
and in statements of management's plans and objectives for future operations.
41. Now embodied in Reg. S-K, Item 10(b).
42. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5,581 (Apr. 28, 1975), reprinted in [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,167.
43. This success is further evident by the increased emphasis on the informal an-
nual report to stockholders rather than a formal Commission document as the basic dis-
closure document. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6,383 (Mar. 3, 1982), reprinted in
[1937-1982 Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
72,328.
model the real world. The FASB principles are still a long way from
showing the time value of money, and neither the Commission nor
the FASB has moved very far in that direction. In fact, the FASB
moved substantially backward in FAS 15 on Accounting by Debtors
and Creditors for Troubled Debt Restructurings, in which it held
that no gain or loss is suffered when a restructuring postpones the
payment of the principal amount of a debt either with no interest or
with very low interest for a long period. This ruling severely under-
cut the principal advance made by the accounting authorities in
APB Opinion No. 21 toward recognition of the time value of money.
Present disclosures do not go very far to disclose to the investor val-
ues which many investors consider important, such as the ability to
borrow, the ability to make acquisitions by the use of "paper" (Le.,
the corporation's newly issued stock), and the ability to leverage
one's assets." Perhaps this kind of value recognition and appraisal
should be left outside of SEC disclosure and relegated to the analyst.
Another individual who played an important part in bringing
the Commission into the real world was Commissioner A. A.
Sommer, Jr. He was among the first to suggest the informal annual
report to stockholders as potentially the most useful disclosure docu-
ment.45 He was also chairman of the SEC Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure, which existed from 1976 to 1977. As a mem-
ber of that committee, I criticized its failure to go far enough in
thinking through the implications of the modern economics of the
securities markets.46 There is no doubt, however, that that committee
made a great advance in causing the Commission to realize the key
position of the professional in securities decisions. The committee
also advanced the push to unify and modernize the forms which led
to the recent integrated securities disclosure system.47 The commit-
tee took the lead in pointing out that the mandated disclosure system
furnished only part of the information needed by and available to the
investor, and does not necessarily furnish this information first.
There is a wide-spread informal disclosure system operating through
informal corporate reports, meetings with financial analysts, press re-
leases, information from suppliers, customers, competitors, and trade
journals. These sources frequently provide information long before it
44. See M.J. WHITMAN & M. SHUBIK, THE AGGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE INVES-
TOR (1979); Whitman & Shubik, Corporate Reality and Accounting for Investors, 39
FIN. EXEC. 52 (May 1971).
45. Sommer, The Annual Report: A Prime Disclosure Document, 1972 DUKE L.J.
1093.
46. Kripke, infra note 63.
47. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6,383 (Mar. 3, 1982), reprinted in [1937-
1982 Accounting Series Release Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,328.
That system places greater reliance on the modern economics of the market than Som-
mer's committee recommended.
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appears in the mandated disclosure system."8 This raises a question,
of course, as to the need for and the purpose of the mandated dis-
closure system, which in turn leads us to PURPOSE FIVE.
PURPOSE FIVE: Requiring that information which may already be
circulating in the market be restated formally in documents filed
with the Commission under threat of statutory penalties.
This filing requirement provides a sanction for the truth of the
informal disclosure system, for discrepancies would be rapidly dis-
closed. 9 PURPOSE FIVE also presents substantial issues of cost and
benefit because a mandated disclosure system could provide the
sanction mentioned simply by the necessity that the bottom lines of
required financial statements jibe with the informal information,
without the present elaboration of the mandatory system."
Without denigrating Burton's and Sommer's contributions, it is
fair to say that the SEC was pushed into modernized and flexible
disclosure in part by commentators"' and in part by general criticism
of its adamant stand. The Commission was far too late in switching
its emphasis from use of disclosure for protective purposes (PURPOSE
Two) to use of disclosure for informational purposes (PURPOSE
THREE). This switch coincided with the increased growth of the
financial analyst profession and the growth of financial in-
termediaries like pension funds and mutual funds which also applied
48. See generally ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, chs. II to VI
(Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMMIT'EE REPORT]. The vast
amount of accounting and economic research on the impact of formal accounting data
and informal data on stock prices and investor behavior is summarized in a FASB Re-
search Report, P.A. GRIFFIN, USEFULNESS TO INVESTORS AND CREDITORS OF INFORMA-
TION PROVIDED BY FINANCIAL REPORTING: A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DATA,
chs. 7, 8 (1982).
49. ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 48, at XI, XVII-XXVI, 310-15.
(The roman numerals refer to the Introduction to the REPORT written by the committee's
Chairman, A.A. Sommer, Jr., who had been a commissioner of the SEC at the beginning
of the committee's functioning).
50. This is particularly the case because much of the information is mandated not
by the SEC, but by a private organization, the FASB, functioning under the protective
enforcement arm of the SEC. The effect is a privately levied tax on issuers in the form of
reporting expense without their consent, for the benefit of the analyst community and the
investment public. While the Financial Analysts Federation and the Securities Industry
Association are sponsors of the FASB, there seems to be no sponsor who could be
deemed the spokesman for issuers. Two possible exceptions are the Financial Executives
Federation and the National Association of Accountants. In each case their members are
primarily accountants in the employ of issuers and potential issuers, who may potentially
have an accountant's bias.
51. See authorities cited supra note 3.
analytic techniques, and a general realization that protective disclos-
ure focusing on fraud prevention excluded materially important in-
formation, including estimates and forecasts needed by investors for
future-based decisions. 2 Investors are not interested in learning from
the past years' earnings figures required by the SEC that they should
have purchased a security five years earlier. Otherwise stated, some
persons buy for the long term; some persons buy for the short term;
but no one buys for the past term.
Disclosure to prevent fraud (PURPOSE Two) could never have
been justified on a cost-efficient basis. Emphasis on conservative ac-
counting principles and hard information may have served initially
to prevent recurrence of the fraud believed to have been characteris-
tic of pre-SEC days, but after a few years attempts to register bla-
tantly fraudulent issues for public sale ceased. The more blatant
forms of fraud took place outside the SEC disclosure system, with
rare exceptions like Equity Funding. The antifraud laws and the
sanctions for failure to register, not the registration process itself, are
the prime tools used to block outright fraud. Considering the number
of speculative issues that are sold despite the SEC's conservative bias
and the most complete disclosure of "risk factors," it is doubtful that
the registration system efficiently protects the public against
speculations.53
The Challenges of Economics to the SEC's System of Disclosure
Even as the SEC began using its disclosure system with a more
appropriate orientation toward the informational needs of investors
(PURPOSE THREE), economic analysis and other factors cast new
doubts on the efficiency of the system. First, it became apparent that
the SEC's disclosure system contained little or no "information," in
the sense of factual knowledge not already available.5 4 Second, the
SEC eventually recognized a necessary correction in its concept of
its informational function (PURPOSE THREE). Several writers insisted
that disclosure concerning a complicated corporation could be under-
stood only by a professional. 55 But SEC officials were gearing their
appeals for brevity and simplicity to the needs of the lay investor,
52. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28, 34-43.
53. For an assertion that the public did not attempt to make securities decisions
from prospectus disclosure as administered by the SEC to 1970, see Kripke, supra note
27, at 1164-75. For an account of the sale of securities for the Tucker automobile despite
the most complete disclosure of unsoundness and risk, see Morton & Booker, supra note
3, at 494.
54. For a discussion of PURPosE FivE see supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
55. Anderson, supra note 3; Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933,
43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933); Kripke, supra note 27; Kripke, The Myth of the Informed
Layman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631 (1973).
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and were insisting that the prospectus be written for the layperson. 56
Toward the end of the 1970's, the SEC recognized that the layper-
son's benefit from securities disclosure comes after a process of filtra-
tion of information through professionals, directly in the form of in-
vestment advice or management and indirectly through their effect
on the market.57 It came to be accepted that the best estimate of the
value of a broadly-traded security-is the market price determined by
the interplay of buyers and sellers in an active market.58 The SEC
very properly referred to this in the explanation of its streamlined
procedures in Form S-3. Form S-3 relies heavily on incorporation by
reference of filed information and reduction of the material that
must physically be furnished to the investor in the filed and distrib-
uted prospectus.
59
The third challenge to the SEC system came from economists'
findings that active securities markets are "efficient," that is, all pub-
licly available information is rapidly "impounded" in the prices of
securities, so that trading or investment on the basis of public infor-
mation is unlikely to produce abnormal profits. The economists con-
cluded that for most investors the best program is to assume that
market prices reflect all available information, the market is fair,
and market prices are the best evidence of value. Therefore, at-
tempts to gain more than normal profit are likely to be useless or
counter-productive, and the proper procedure is to hold a portfolio of
securities diversified by industries, rather than trading in the hope of
beating the market. 0
56. Levenson, Appropriate Disclosure, REV. SEC. REG. 961 (March 4, 1971). Mr.
Levenson was then Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance.
57. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 48, at 312-14.
58. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6,176 (Jan. 15, 1980), reprinted in [1979-
1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 82,422; SEC Securities Act Release
No. 6,235 (Sept. 2, 1980), reprinted in [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 82,649; SEC Securities Act Release No. 6,338 (Aug. 6, 1981), reprinted in
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH Report No. 926, 2d Extra Ed.); Kaplan, The Information
Content of Financial Accounting Numbers, in THE IMPACT OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
PRACTICE AND DISCLOSURE 167 (A.R. Abdel-Khalik & T.F. Keller, eds. 1978).
59. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6,383 (March 3, 1982), reprinted in [1937-
1982 Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 72,328.
The discussion of Form S-3 shows that this form implements this insight. Form S-3 ap-
pears at 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 7,151.
60. The literature on this economic thinking is vast, and much of it is highly tech-
nical. Introductions to it and to its literature can be found in J. COHEN, E. ZINBARG &
A. ZEIKEL, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT, ch. 15-17, (3d ed.
1977); J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 171-
97 (1973); Black, Implications of the Random Work Hypothesis for Portfolio Manage-
ment, 27 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 16 (Mar.-Apr., 1971); Kripke, A Search for a Meaningful
Equally important were the economic findings that the risks of
particular securities can be reduced by adequate diversification.
Modern portfolio theory bases investment on appropriate diversifica-
tion of the portfolio, not on intensive study of the individual secur-
ity.61 Many institutional investors now invest, at least in part, on an
index fund basis. They are trying to parallel in their holdings a
broad representation of the market, rather than picking individual
securities and trading actively. The vast College Retirement Equities
Fund (CREF) recently announced that 80% of its $11.5 billion port-
folio is managed on an index fund basis to "generally track the re-
sults of the entire U.S. stock market. Most of this 80% is invested in
Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 stocks, held in proportion to their
weights in this well-known indicator, with the balance invested in a
representative sampling of non-S&P stocks.1
6 2
On their face, these theories leave little room for the present dis-
closure system. Admittedly, not all theorists or participants in the
investment world accept them, but certain conclusions seem ines-
capable. Diversification leaves the small investor with so little invest-
ment in any particular company that it is scarcely worth his while to
wade through the enormously complicated disclosures, financial and
otherwise, in the annual report and prospectus disclosure system, or
in the proxy system. The average stockholder thinks of himself or
herself as an investor, not an owner of the corporation, and has little
interest in proxy disclosures relating to the character, experience,
stockholdings, remuneration, and perquisites of management. In-
stead of trying to exercise control as an owner of the business, such
an average stockholder thinks of himself as an investor who, if he is
dissatisfied, tends to sell out and look for a different company.
As a member of the SEC Advisory Committee on Corporate Dis-
closure in 1976 and 1977, I was unable to get the committee to
study adequately the impact of the new economics on the disclosure
system. To this I dissented."' The Commission itself, however, in the
last five years has paid more attention to the new economics. The
SEC has recited the theory of the efficient market as justification for
reducing the disclosures required in the prospectuses of large,
Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAW 293 (1975); Modigliani & Pogue, An Introduction to
Risk and Return, Concepts and Evidence, 30 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 68 (Mar.-Apr., 1974) &
30 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 69 (May-June, 1974); Vasicek & McQuown, The Efficient Market
Model, 28 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 71 (Sept.-Oct. 1972); H. KRIPKE, supra note 25, pt. II.
61. See references supra note 60.
62. TEACHERS INSURANCE & ANNUITY ASS'N - COLLEGE RETIREMENT EQUITIES
FUND, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (1983).
63. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 48 at D-49 (Dissenting Statement
of Homer Kripke). I enlarged this dissent in Kripke, Where Are We on Securities Dis-
closure After the Advisory Committee Report?, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 99 (1968), and in 2 J.
AcCT., AUDITING & FIN. 4 (1968). See also H. KRIPKE, supra note 25, pt. II.
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widely-traded companies6 4 and for permitting incorporation by refer-
ence. For less widely traded securities, it has permitted physical at-
tachment of filings from the continuous reporting system instead of
requiring repetition of information in the prospectus. Finally, the
Commission has approved "shelf registration.16 5 Shelf registration
essentially eliminates the waiting period which was originally
designed to give investors time to study the securities before they are
subject to buying pressure from underwriters and dealers.6"
All of these devices are commendable and I have commended
them.6 7 I have also commended a rationalization of the Commis-
sion's exemptions from registration under the Securities Act for non-
public issues and small issues,68 although I have pointed out some
dead- wood in the system which has not yet been pruned.69 There is
still a need for an even more drastic pruning of dead wood in the
Securities Act registration system.
For the large and widely-traded companies using Form S-3, the
system has become merely pro forma, with perfunctory disclosure
through incorporation by reference. Any investor sophisticated
enough to obtain the information incorporated by reference knows of
its availability without the formal incorporation by reference. The
typical investor will never have or use the full disclosure. Instead, as
the Commission expected, investors will make decisions by relying
upon professionals or the market price. These two sources constitute
an investor's principal protection. Therefore, apart from achieving
formal compliance with present statutory requirements, 1933 Act
disclosure for the largest companies now serves little or no purpose.70
64. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6,383 (Mar. 3, 1982), reprinted in [1937-
1982 Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 72,328,
and Form S-3, reprinted in 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 7,151.
65. Reversing a long-standing prior position, the Commission by Rule 415 now
permits companies to register securities under the 1933 Act "for the shelf," so that when
they are ready to sell them they can determine price and underwriting terms and be in a
position to sell very rapidly without the traditional twenty-day (or longer) waiting period
under § 8(a) of the 1933 Act. This enables issuers to hit a "window," a brief favorable
situation in the market.
66. Rule 415, reprinted in 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 5,813. Compare Heller,
supra note 34 and accompanying text. The Commission has recently extended Rule 415,
but has limited its use to Form S-3 companies. Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1983, at 2, col. 2.
67. Kripke, Has the SEC Taken All of the Dead Wood Out of Its Disclosure
System?, 38 Bus. LAW. 833 (1983).
68. Reg. D, (Rules 501-506), adopted in SEC Securities Act Release No. 6,389
(Mar. 8, 1982), reprinted in [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
T 83,106. See Kripke, supra note 67.
69. See Kripke, supra note 67.
70. Friedman, Address to New York Chapter of Financial Executives Institute,
This is a major problem because liability risks (at least theoretical
ones) are imposed on underwriters who are being pushed by issuers
into deciding very quickly whether to take securities off the shelf
under Rule 415. This certainly makes it difficult, if not impossible,
for underwriters to comply with the statutory expectation that they
police the issuers' disclosure in their own interest under the threat of
liability.7 1 Statutory liability could be preserved and the Commission
could mandate delivery of a description of the issue, without filing, if
we had the courage to break a fifty-year-old habit. 2
In summary, the Commission's disclosure system cannot be given
high marks either for performance or on a cost/benefit basis during
its first forty years. The system was founded not on disclosure of "all
material facts," but on disclosure of events in the past which the
Commission could objectively verify. This historical perspective was
assumed for the inefficient purpose of preventing blatant securities
fraud (PURPOSE Two) and for the less apparent purpose of protect-
ing the Commission from criticism for issues that turn sour (PuR-
POSE FOUR). In recent years, while the Commission has shown com-
mendable willingness to try to modernize the system, developments
and economic theory have outrun adaptation of the system. A large
apparatus of disclosure which serves little purpose still remains. The
disclosure mandated for large companies by the Securities Act does
not reach the public in any more useful fashion than the same infor-
mation already reaches the public through the companies' reports to
stockholders and the Securities Exchange Act disclosure system. The
purpose of mandated disclosure, when so many investment decisions
turn on subjective factors dependent on each investor's time frame
and portfolio position, has not been completely thought through. The
Commission has been content to pass increasing responsibility to ac-
countants not only for accounting but also for all financial disclos-
ure.73 The 1933 Act and the purposes of mandated disclosure need
summarized in Deloitte Haskins & Sells, The Week in Review (April 3, 1981). Mr.
Friedman was then a commissioner of the SEC.
71. See Olson, Spotlight Shines Anew on Statutory Diligence Tasks, Legal Times,
April 4, 1983, at 14, col. 1.
72. An SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers has recommended that a
tender offer by exchange of stock instead of for cash could take effect without a registra-
tion statement for the stock having become effective. An SEC staff member commented:
"I don't think it is way out at all." Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1983, at 31, col. 3. Yet if there is
ever a case for the full Securities Act registration process with a waiting period, effective
registration statement, and full prospectus, it is in the case of an exchange offer. In that
case, the offeree needs up-to-date information on both companies and prospective
changes in them; for example, the offeror's plans and pro forma financials.
73. If the statutory disclosure system has any real purpose, the SEC, not one of the
participating professions, has to take responsibility for its responsiveness to need. A re-
cent article asserts that the supplementary disclosures mandated by the FASB's FAS 33
show that earnings of corporations generally and of most individual corporations are less
satisfactory than the primary statements based on historical cost seem to indicate. Evans
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fundamental rethinking as we embark on a new fifty years; however,
signs that this rethinking is in process are not visible.
PART II: THE PURPOSES BEHIND THE SEC's OVERREACHING
IN THE 1970's
The 1970's spawned overregulation in many fields, such as the air-
lines, motor transport, the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration, and the Environmental Protection Administration. The older
agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Federal Trade Commission also reflected the prevailing tendency in
government.
7 4
In its enforcement operations the SEC was undoubtedly disturbed
by low corporate standards, which first showed themselves in illegal
political contributions and later in "questionable payments" (fre-
& Freeman, Statement 33 Disclosures Confirm Profit Illusion in Primary Statements,
FASB VIEWPOINTS (June 24, 1983). But see supra note 37.
Harold M. Williams, the SEC's last retiring chairman, has recently said:
We are becoming increasingly aware that the simple model used in accounting
is not adequate to explain real world phenomena. In fact, traditional accounting
may be attempting the impossible. It is not possible to present the complex phe-
nomenon of a business in a statement of the traditional type ....
The approach may have to change more dramatically and provide users with
a set of disaggregated information and disclosure which they can analyze in
evaluating the enterprise.
Williams, The FASB, Where Do We Go From Here? Prospective and Prognosis: The
Next Ten Years 43 (lecture at the 1983 Arthur Young Professors Roundtable, Arden
House, Columbia University, May 5-7, 1983).
Williams continues to support standard-setting in the private sector. But I do not see
how mandated statutory disclosure can be justified if the agency that should be responsi-
ble for facing these absolutely fundamental issues leaves them to the accountants while it
pursues the more spectacular issues of inside trading and fraud.
74. In an article entitled Regulation, Social Policy and Class Conflict, Paul H.
Weaver distinguished between what he called the Old Regulation by such agencies as the
Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Communications Commission, and
the New Regulation by later-formed agencies like OSHA, EPA, and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission. He thought that the Old Regulation was concerned with
supporting and furthering business in a mixed economy, and transcending markets to the
extent necessary, all in the liberal tradition. He found the New Regulation to be "sys-
tematically statist," and possessing an animus "against the liberal values served by cor-
porate capitalism and the benefits these institutions provide to the broad mass of the
American people. . .[including] the many options and freedoms these make possible for
ordinary citizens." These characterizations and distinctions represent a debatable thesis;
this is not the place to debate them. I note them here merely to make clear that, while I
think that the SEC in the 1970's absorbed some of the then current tendencies toward
overregulation, I do not attribute to the SEC any of Weaver's characterizations of the
older agencies, such as being devoted to redistribution, or any of the animus which he
asserts that the New Regulation displayed against liberal values. Weaver, Regulation,
Social Policy and Class Conflict, 50 THE PUB. INTEREST 45 (Winter, 1978).
quently a euphemism for direct or indirect bribery of public offi-
cials). Abusive perquisites were taken by corporate management and
other insiders, and "sweetheart loans" were made by banks to affili-
ates of insiders or other favored customers. The SEC also believed
that boards of directors and stockholders were letting managements
operate without effective control and that corporate counsel were lax
in permitting their clients to approach or exceed the boundaries of
legality. The SEC thought that state corporation laws and state
courts gave stockholders insufficient protection against overreaching
by corporate insiders in violation of fiduciary obligations to investors.
Accordingly, the SEC in the 1970's purported to find two addi-
tional purposes of securities legislation:
PURPOSE SIX: Increasing corporate responsibility by improving the
system of corporate governance;
PURPOSE SEVEN: Improving corporate morality in respect to stat-
utes administered by the SEC and in respect to business conduct
generally.
Instead of seeking additional express statutory powers, the SEC
sought to fulfill these purposes by pushing the limits of its existing
powers. Seemingly, the SEC felt like Horatius alone at the bridge,75
the one defender of high standards in the public interest. It thought
itself charged with broad duties as pater patriae-father of the peo-
ple-with power to discharge these duties based on enormously flex-
ible and broad interpretation of its specific powers, and perhaps from
a general emanation of authority going beyond its specifically
granted powers.
The SEC's express powers in the field of corporate governance are
limited. They are principally reflected in the proxy rules. Undoubt-
edly the proxy rules are an express power in the field, but the statu-
tory authorization for the rules was intended to assist the stockhold-
ers in exercising control by giving them information with which to
exercise their voting franchise, not to authorize the SEC to control
the methods and purposes of corporate governance. Unfortunately,
the statutory effort of Congress and the vast rule-making and en-
forcement activity of the SEC have been ineffective for two funda-
mental reasons. First, diversification of portfolios leaves individual
stockholders with so little investment in the individual company that
they are uninterested in trying as owners to control the company's
conduct. They see themselves only as investors who can and do move
out of a company with which they are dissatisfied. Second, no feasi-
ble method exists for small stockholders to concert activity before an
75. See E.S. SHUCKBURGH, A HISTORY OF ROME 64-65 (1917).
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annual or special meeting and agree on positions. Nor is there any
feasible method of direct nomination of directors by independent
stockholders so that the stockholders can reach an agreement as to
which nominees they will support. Effective stockholder participation
in corporate governance remains nonexistent; the directors are in
fact nominated by management. The stockholders' power to intro-
duce proposals for action at the meeting under Securities Exchange
Act Rule 14a(8) has long been a subject of controversy and has re-
cently been amended to reduce the occasions on which stockholders
can resort to it.
76
A proposal was made to use the proxy rules to extend the SEC's
powers vastly. The proposal was to require the existence of an audit
committee to be disclosed in the proxy statement, which would force
the company either to create an audit committee, or be guilty of
having made a false assertion in its proxy statement." Even though
this was seriously proposed by a general counsel of the SEC as a
source of power, it was wisely ignored by the SEC. The very occur-
rence of the proposal shows the mood of the SEC staff in the 1970's.
The outcome of these efforts to make the proxy rules effective for
corporate governance in the 1970's was to proliferate meaningless
detailed disclosure regarding officers' and directors' salaries, fringe
benefits, perquisites, stock ownership, and experience of nominees.
None of this information has ever served to lessen management's
control of the director election process through the proxy rules. The
principal result was to increase the wealth of legal printers. Much of
this proliferation of useless disclosure has recently been undone by
the SEC.78
The SEC also tried to affect corporate management by reforming
the board of directors of the public corporation. Former SEC Chair-
man Williams urged in several speeches that the board be composed
of independent directors, who would pay more attention to the inter-
ests of larger constituencies such as employees, suppliers, customers,
and the general community, as well as the interests of stockholders
76. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19,135 (Oct. 14, 1982), reprinted
in [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,262.
77. Opinion of SEC General Counsel on the Commission's Authority to Require
Public Companies to Establish Independent Audit Committees (March 2, 1978), re-
printed in [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 81,535.
78. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 20,091 (Aug. 16, 1983) (amending
17 C.F.R. § 240), reprinted in [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 83,417. See
Spencer & Olson, Dissonant Chorus Greets SEC Proxy, Perk Rule Changes, Legal
Times, Nov. 7, 1983, at 13.
alone. The SEC has no authority in that direction, however, and at-
tempts to find authority failed. 79
The SEC's Questionable Methods of Intrusion into Corporate
Governance
The staff then resorted to devices presenting serious questions of
policy. Agreements for the appointment of independent directors
were obtained during negotiations for consent decrees to settle in-
junction actions, or negotiations to accept agreed disclosures regard-
ing questioned transactions in lieu of formal charges of violations.
The SEC thus used indirect pressures to achieve what it could not
achieve directly using its granted powers. 80 The SEC also used pres-
sure to induce the New York Stock Exchange to require listed com-
panies to have audit committees.
A questionable assertion of a disputed power was used to push the
SEC into the field of corporate governance by disciplining lawyers
under Rule 2(e). a1 The Commission sought to force lawyers to be-
come what one author called "The SEC's Reluctant Police Force '82
by trying to force lawyers to support the SEC in the enforcement of
the statutes. Commissioners argued expressly that because they had
a small staff and Congress would not give them the budget to hire
79. SEC STAFF, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY, (Comm. Print of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 1980).
SEC Chairman Williams resigned following the 1980 election, but before that he
played a significant role in getting the American Law Institute to take on a project of
reforming corporate governance. The Institute has been working on this project with re-
porters whom I respect. They have produced some debatable drafts congruent with Wil-
liams' views. ALT, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE (Tent.
Draft No. 1 1982). The first public draft was resoundingly rejected by the American Bar
Association's Litigation Section and by the Business Roundtable in separate reports. See
Statement of the Business Roundtable on the American Law Institute's Proposed Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations
(1983). The criticisms are discussed in Arieff, ALI Governance Recommendations Criti-
cized, Legal Times, Feb. 28, 1983, at I, and in a lecture by Roswell B. Perkins, President
of the ALI, to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (March 14, 1983).
Where this initiative which stems in part from the SEC will be going is anyone's guess.
80. These points are covered in more detail in Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Gov-
ernance and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW. 173 (1981). The validity and propriety of
this form of ancillary relief in consent decrees are reviewed in Dent, Ancillary Relief in
Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REV. 865 (1983).
81. See Siedel, Rule 2(e) and Corporate Officers, 39 Bus. LAW. 455 (1984). In
Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979) the Court sustained the valid-
ity of Rule 2(e) as to accountants, and in a remarkable dictum suggested that the same
conclusion applied to lawyers. The Touche Ross case was settled after the Second Circuit
decision. In footnote 126 of the article, Siedel cites another lawyers assertion that "many
consider the Touche Ross settlement a sweetheart deal for the defendant. The theory is
that, because the SEC did not want to provide the U.S. Supreme Court with an oppor-
tunity to review the Court of Appeals decision, an offer was made that the defendant
could not refuse."
82. Lipman, The SECs Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49
N.Y.U. L. REv. 437 (1974).
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more staff, they had the right to force lawyers to assist in enforcing
the laws (perhaps like a sheriff who calls on the public to serve as
members of a posse to enforce the law). The commissioners not only
made speeches to that effect but in the case of In re Carter and
Johnson,83 the SEC began a proceeding which, in my opinion, was
begun primarily because the staff saw an opportunity to teach a les-
son in corporate governance. The lesson was that when a client fails
to follow his lawyer's advice in respect to compliance with the securi-
ties laws, the lawyer must do something or he may be found to be
lacking in the ethical character that entitles one to practice before
the SEC. The Commission ultimately reached a questionable result,
namely, that it would not punish the attorneys because the doctrine
had not been pronounced before; however, it would use the occasion
to make law by questionable dictum and to issue a warning that on
the next occasion it would take action. Having terminated the case
by dismissal, the SEC submitted its dictum to the Bar for comment,
saying that it did not want any discussion as to the SEC's power to
punish lawyers, but merely wanted views on the formula proposed."
The American Bar Association refused to comment on the formula
and simply took the position that the SEC had no power to punish
lawyers for conduct outside the hearing room (except, of course, for
violation of law)."' We have not heard of the SEC's dictum since.
An SEC power more firmly rooted than the use of consent decrees
and Rule 2(e) is its general power to prevent and punish securities
fraud. The statutes contain direct prohibitions against fraud in sales
or other transactions in securities. The SEC added to its arsenal by
using its general rule-making powers to adopt Rule 14a(9) as an
antifraud rule which applies to the solicitation of proxies under sec-
tion 14(a) of the Exchange Act.86 The Commission also adopted the
famous Rule 10b-5,8 7 incorporating section 17 of the Securities Act
and making it applicable to buyers as well as sellers. The SEC found
the power to do so in catch-all statutory section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act, which authorizes rules forbidding manipulative
83. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,597 (Feb. 28, 1981), reprinted
in [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847.
84. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6,344 (Sept. 21, 1981), reprinted in [1981-
1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,026.
85. See Ad Hoc Committee of the Section of Corporation Banking and Business
Law of the American Bar Association, SEC Standard of Conduct for Lawyers, 37 Bus.
LAW 915 (1982).
86. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983).
87. Id. at § 240.10b-5.
or deceptive devices. 8  Rule 1Ob-5 was not adopted until 1942, eight
years after the 1934 Act was passed, and it attracted little attention
at the time. It became more important a few years later when in
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.89 the court held that private civil
causes of action could be implied for violation of the rule.
Generally speaking, the SEC did little with the antifraud rules un-
til World War II except to pursue obvious securities fraud. That war
slowed down the SEC as it did all peacetime agencies. During the
Truman and Eisenhower eras, the SEC remained nonaggressive and
nonexpansive. The return of aggressiveness came during the 1960's
under Chairmen Cary and Cohen, and was accelerated in the 1970's.
In that atmosphere, the SEC purported to find dynamic, expansive
power in the antifraud provisions of the statutes. This expansion of
power was achieved by decoupling the statutory concept of fraud
from the common law precedents. The SEC seemed to believe that
"fraud" could mean anything that the SEC did not want to hap-
pen. 0° With this weapon, the SEC apparently thought it was free to
roam at will in the corporate field.
An early sign of this came in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,91 which
held that it was fraudulent for an insider to trade in a corporation's
securities using inside information stemming from the corporation,
unless the information was first made available to the public. The
reasoning in Chairman Cary's opinion is important to our discussion
below. He reasoned that inside information about the corporation is
corporate property, and that no one has the right to take it for his or
her own benefit by trading on it. This position appears to have re-
ceived general acceptance. It seems fair that insiders and their "tip-
pees" should not be trading on inside information. 2 The first court
approval of this position came in the famous Texas Gulf Sulphur
case.9
3
The SEC then tried to go further. Lawyers within the agency sug-
gested that the doctrine should not be limited to inside information
88. Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
89. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa., 1946).
90. 1 do not mean to suggest common law fraud or deceit was a static concept,
incapable of development to adapt to changing practices and new situations. The ques-
tion is one of degree, and particularly what content can reasonably be put into broad
words without precise meaning, in our federal system and under our administrative sys-
tem of delegated powers.
91. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
92. It is important, however, to note, as Professor Wang has demonstrated, that it
is impossible to determine who is victimized by insider trading. Wang, Trading on Mate-
rial Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who
Can Sue Whom Under S.E.C. Rule IOb-5, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981). The major-
ity of the Supreme Court recognized this in Dirks v. SEC, discussed infra text accompa-
nying notes 119-126.
93. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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stemming from the corporation. They believed that it should apply to
information concerning transactions overhanging the market or
events that might affect demand and supply for the company's secur-
ities in the market ("market information"), and indeed to any non-
public information.94 The SEC brought such a case against Oppen-
heimer & Company, a broker-dealer. As one might expect, the
Commission said that it was not going to punish the brokers for
passing on nonpublic information to their clients because the law had
not been determined at the time of the events. However, the SEC
did issue a warning that it believed that it had power to punish use
of nonpublic market information in the future.
95
The SEC's market information initiative was repelled by the Su-
preme Court in Chiarella v. United States.6 The Court held that
there could not be a duty not to trade unless a prior fiduciary rela-
tionship existed between the issuer and the trader. In Chiarella the
trader was an employee of the legal printing company that was
printing a tender offer.
Subsequent lower court decisions circumvented Chiarella by find-
ing criminal liability for trading on the basis of market information
used in violation of obligations to a tender offeror, although there
were no obligations to the issuer.9
The SEC sought to bypass Chiarella, which had interpreted sec-
tion 10 and Rule lOb-5, by adopting a rule under section 14(e) of
the 1934 Act. Rule 14e-3 characterizes such trading as a fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of sec-
tion 14(e).1 The SEC has also proposed legislation in the present
Congress which might codify this principle, although the bill's
draftsmanship is open to question.9 It remains to be seen whether
94. See generally, Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the
Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1973).
95. In re Oppenheimer & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12,319
(Apr. 2, 1976), reprinted in [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
T 80,551; see Brudney, infra note 101.
96. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
97. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 193 (1983); SEC v. Materia, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,526,
amended, 99,543 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). But another panel of the same court which decided
Newman also held on the Newman facts that there was no liability to members of the
public who traded during the period. Moss v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 719 F.2d 5 (2d
Cir. 1983), reprinted in [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,478 (Sept. 9, 1983).
The resulting confusion is discussed in Fogelson & Stein, Insider Trading After 'Dirks,'
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1983, at 29.
98. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1983).
99. See infra text accompanying notes 126-136.
this type of extension of the inside information doctrine will
survive.1 0o
The ultimate extension of this movement Was toward an ideologi-
cal view entertained in some quarters that everyone must have equal
opportunity for access to all relevant information in the market.10'
This view was reflected in the Commission's Order for Public Pro-
ceedings in In re Boston Co. Institutional Investors,10 2 more com-
monly known as the Dirks case because it arose out of Mr. Dirks'
disclosure of fraud in Equity Funding Corporation. In the order, the
Commission simply alleged that the respondents traded while in pos-
session of nonpublic information. It did not allege that they had re-
ceived information from insiders or that they had stolen the informa-
tion or that they acquired it in any other disreputable fashion. The
allegation was simply that they had traded while they had informa-
tion that the public did not have. In an article'03 and an appendix to
my book 0 4 I asserted that the Commission could never establish the
law as broadly as that. In fact, the SEC staff did not attempt this at
the early stages of the case. This was fortunate for the staff, in light
of the Supreme Court's express rejection of the concept in Chiarella
and Dirks.0 5 Instead the staff tried the case as an inside information
case.
The special feature of the Dirks case was that the company denied
the truth of the so-called inside information because the information
asserted that the company's financial statements were fraudulent.
Moreover, the so-called insiders from whom the information first
came were discharged employees who were merely trying to bring
the fraud to public attention without a personal profit, by inducing
selling, because public authorities seemed nonresponsive. Dirks was
investigating and spreading the reports of fraud at least in part to
further this purpose, although there was also inconclusive evidence
that he had a purpose of obtaining brokerage orders for the firm of
which he was an employee. Thus, factually the case represented an
expansion in the concept of improper trading on inside information.
The result of the Dirks case will be discussed below after additional
context has been set forth.1 6
In the late 1970's the SEC began using its new doctrine of con-
100. See Fogelson & Stein, supra note 97.
101. Cf. Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979).
102. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,729 (Aug. 24,
1976).
103. Kripke, An Unusual Opportunity for Rethinking Concepts on a Fundamental
Level, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 13, 1976, at 27, col. 2.
104. H. KRIPKE, supra note 32, app. B.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 119-126.
106. See infra text accompanying notes 119-126.
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structive fraud to assume the role of defender of securities investors
on all fronts, going far beyond express statutory delegations of au-
thority. Some of the SEC staff have defended this point of view by
arguing that there is no attorney's privilege against the SEC. In Gar-
ner v. Wolfinbarger010 the court held that there is no attorney's privi-
lege against stockholders in favor of attorneys who act for the corpo-
ration and its officers and directors, because the stockholders are the
corporation and therefore are the client. One cannot have an attor-
ney's privilege against his client. The SEC staff asserted that since it
is the shield and defender of the stockholders or clients, this rule
should apply to it. That proposition has never been seriously tested.
In the 1970's, the SEC supported private litigants who contended
that mergers or similar corporate transactions were fraudulent be-
cause management was treating minority stockholders unfairly. The
Supreme Court blocked this development in Santa Fe Industries Inc.
v. Green, 08 by holding that breach of a fiduciary obligation (in the
absence of nondisclosure) was a matter of state law and is not secur-
ities fraud. This issue has been complicated, as lower federal courts
have circumvented the Supreme Court decision.109 A technical dis-
cussion of the distinction which those cases draw from Santa Fe is
beyond my present purpose.
Another reason for this expanded concept of statutory fraud was
the SEC's concern that managements were treating minority stock-
holders unfairly with the "going private" tactic. °10 Some manage-
ments, having taken their companies public when stock prices were
107. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
108. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
109. E.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1069 (1978); Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir.
1980).
110. See Sommer, "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, A Law
Advisory Council Lecture at Notre Dame Law School (Nov. 14, 1974) (Mr. Sommer
was then an SEC commissioner), reprinted in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 80,010. See also Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L. REV.
1019 (1975).
Another aspect of going private was the "leveraged buyout," in which the SEC was
concerned that although all stockholders might be offered the same price, management
might have an unfair advantage through employment contracts, special opportunity for
tax benefits, etc. The SEC used its power to publish information concerning violations
under § 21(a) of the 1934 Act to publicize the facts and to hold up such deals pending
review of the fairness question by an independent person. See, e.g., In re Spartek, Inc.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,367 (Feb. 14, 1979), reprinted in [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,961. Commissioner Karmel dissented to
use of this power in that fashion without actually charging anyone with a violation of
law.
good, decided that the burden of filing periodic reports with the SEC
and proxy statements with the stockholders was too great once the
market turned down, and stock prices and market conditions were no
longer suitable for acquisitions. Management then offered to buy
back stock held by the public or force the public out through cash
mergers or other techniques. These offers looked bad, because even
though the offer price was above the then current market price, it
was often below the original public sale price. The SEC decided that
this was a serious fraud problem and took the position that any com-
pany which had gone public had thereby represented that it would
maintain the status of being a public company. As originally pro-
posed, Rule 13e-3 would have provided substantive regulation of
these transactions. The Bar protested, however, because Santa Fe
clearly indicated that the SEC has no power over fiduciary obliga-
tions. The SEC retreated from its proposed substantive regulation of
going private transactions, and adopted a different Rule 13e-3 based
on disclosure. This rule is now law,""1 and practitioners tell me that
it is even more onerous than the originally proposed regulation.
Finally, using the open-end concept of statutory fraud, the SEC
has in many instances undertaken to police, through disclosure, all
corporate morality of management, including actions which, al-
though disreputable, have nothing to do with securities or securities
legislation. 12 This is said to bear on the "integrity of management"
or to be "qualitative materiality," as distinguished from quantitative
materiality which relates to whether any particular matter may have
a bearing on the value of the stockholders' investment.
The first examples of qualitative materiality involved cases of ille-
gal corporate political contributions, which obviously had nothing to
do with securities legislation. The issue was then broadened to in-
clude so-called "questionable payments" to foreign officials in the ef-
fort to get contracts. Note the term "questionable payments." In
many cases the payments were clearly not unlawful under the law of
the foreign country where they were made, although they may have
been questionable by American standards. The SEC began forcing
disclosure of these in proxy statements, on the ground that they re-
lated to the integrity of management who were candidates for reelec-
tion as directors. In many cases, the management had not been
guilty of paying bribes for any personal benefit to themselves; rather,
they had submitted reluctantly to the practices which prevail in
many countries in Asia, Africa, and South America, where, in order
to move government or to get an equal hearing from government,
one has to pay off the right people. Many American corporate man-
Ill. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1983).
112. See Kripke, supra note 80, at 188.
[VOL. 21: 257, 1984] Securities Regulation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
agements made these payments reluctantly, and without personal
gain, because they believed it was necessary and in the best interests
of the corporation. The SEC did not distinguish between cases of
personal grafting and this kind of conduct on behalf of the corpora-
tion. Instead, the SEC gave them equal publicity. It used the result-
ing public disturbance to put through the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act which gave the SEC new powers over corporate books and cor-
porate internal control.113 Without describing other SEC crusades of
the time,114 I will refer to former Commissioner Karmel's book, Reg-
ulation by Prosecution.115
To summarize Part II up to this point: In 1973, there was a secur-
ities institute in Washington under the auspices of the American Bar
Association. Ray Garrett, Jr., then the new chairman of the SEC, in
his keynote address at the institute, noted that during the preceding
ten-year period of great vigor, with the country moving again (to use
President Kennedy's words), we had the biggest and most blatant
securities frauds in history. I suggested that the explanation of Gar-
rett's phenomenon might be that the SEC was guilty of the sin of
hubris, the Greek word which is usually translated "pride" or "arro-
gance." In this case, I said, the arrogance was in "thinking that what
you were doing was the most important thing in the world and that
some more of the same would be still better.""' 6
The SEC was arrogating to itself power and jurisdiction which
were not within the fair intendment of the statutes, and as to which
it did not have any consensus supporting its new purposes. As Pat-
rick Moynihan said long before he was a senator: "Somehow liberals
have been unable to acquire from life what conservatives seem to be
endowed with at birth, namely, a healthy skepticism of the powers of
government agencies to do good.""11 7 This remark sounds a proper
cautionary note, which the SEC failed to heed in its expansive push
of the 1970's.
The last ten or fifteen years have been marked by government
overregulation. There has been too little recognition of the govern-
ment's limited power to change things by fiat or by enforcement and
113. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 113b(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a note, 78m,
78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1982). For comment on the enactment of this statute, see Kripke,
supra note 80, at 191-92.
114. See H. KRIPKE, supra note 25, at 18-20.
115. Supra note 6 and accompanying text.
116. Kripke, Wrap-up, 29 Bus. LAW. 185 (Spec. No., March 1974).
117. Moynihan, Where the Liberals Went Wrong, Boston Globe, Aug. 5, 1967,
pt. A at 5.
of the undesirability of a heavy governmental hand. The SEC over-
stepped its boundaries in the 1970's, but recently new faces in the
SEC have properly retracted the boundaries. They have withdrawn
some of the expansive positions I have just described.1 '
In 1983, however, as the first fifty years of federal securities regu-
lation were drawing to a close, Dirks 119 came before the Supreme
Court for decision. The SEC pursued the case even though it had its
determination affirmed in the court of appeals by only a 2 to 1 vote
without a majority opinion, and with only a single judge expressing
his reasons for his vote. 20 The SEC could not support and did not
defend this opinion or its reasoning before the Supreme Court. It
sought to defend this slim victory before the Supreme Court despite
the fact that the Solicitor General filed a brief on behalf of the
United States in opposition. This strange situation, when considered
with the SEC's proposed legislation on the subject of insider trading
as described below, is so remarkable that it warrants further
discussion.
In the mid-1970's, while the SEC was pursuing expansionist poli-
cies, its long record of success in the Supreme Court of the United
States came to a halt. The SEC lost a series of cases, many of them
concerned with the meaning of Rule lOb-5 and related rules.' 21 At
an American Law Institute-American Bar Association (ALI-ABA)
program on the Supreme Court and the Federal Securities Laws,
held in Washington on March 10 and 11, 1977, I was the first
speaker, at the request of Harvey Pitt, then General Counsel of the
SEC. My outline in the coursebook122 ends with the following:
118. See, e.g., Fedders, Illegal Conduct - Materiality - An Enforcement Over-
view, 14 Sec. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 2057 (July-Dec. 1982) (Mr. Fedders is Director
of the Division of Enforcement of the SEC); Longstreth, SEC Disclosure Policy Regard-
ing Management Integrity, 38 Bus. LAW 1413 (1983) (the author was an SEC commis-
sioner). The principal thrust is a more cautious attitude on integrity disclosure in the
absence of economic materiality or personal gain. See also Address by Edward F.
Greene, then General Counsel of the SEC, foreshadowing a more circumspect use of
Rule 2(e) against lawyers, Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings Before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 14 SEc. REG. & L. REP. 168 (Jan. 13, 1982). Similarly, Lee J.
Spencer, Jr., when Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, in effect announced
the abandonment of the unsound and undefended "presumptive underwriter doctrine,"
used during the 1970's to muddle the question of duty to register securities in secondary
distribution situations and other situations. See H. KRIPKE, supra note 25, at 250-53.
See also the discussion of Rule 415 and the relaxation of proxy rules as to management
compensation, supra notes 65-66, 70-72, 78 and accompanying text.
119. Supra text accompanying notes 101-06.
120. Dirks v. SEC, 220 U.S. App. D.C. 309, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
121. See Pitt, The Supreme Court's Securities Law Decisions: What's Wrong with
the Picture?, lecture at the ALI-ABA Program described infra note 122 and accompany-
ing text. Mr. Pitt was then General Counsel of the SEC. Later, as a practicing lawyer he
reviewed these cases again. See Pitt, 'Dirks' Deals Blow to SEC Insider Program, Legal
Times, July 11, 1983, at 10.
122. ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials - The Supreme Court and the Federal
Securities Laws 5 (March 10-11, 1977).
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"'Quos deus volt perdere prius dementat."123 Did these earlier victo-
ries . . lead the Commission into unlawyerlike and vulnerable liti-
gating positions?" I then suggested that the Commission has been
unlawyerlike and lacking in statemanship, in seeking unlimited ex-
pansion of the word "fraud" in Rule 1Ob-5 and related provisions
through litigation, instead of seeking a meaningful consensus by leg-
islation or a rule-making process. The Dirks case, which came to a
climax more than six years later and after a continuing series of
SEC defeats, regrettably clearly illustrates my appellation "unlawy-
erlike." The legislation on insider trading which the SEC proposed
while Dirks was pending, discussed below, illustrates my appellation
"lacking in statemanship."
To establish that Dirks' conduct constituted "fraud" or "manipu-
lation," the SEC had to deduce from those words the following con-
clusions: First, knowledge that management is guilty of recording
fraudulent transactions is "inside information," even if the company
is denying the accusation. The requirement of Cady Roberts124 that
the information be for the exclusive use of the company may be dis-
regarded in the prohibitions on trading on inside information. Sec-
ond, the fact that public authorities, including the SEC, had ignored
attempts to bring the information to the public did not justify the
possessor in bringing it forcibly to public attention, without profit to
himself, by inducing selling, even though he was not violating a duty
to the company in doing so. Third, the tippee, Dirks, who cooperated
in the effort without direct profit to himself or his firm by inducing
trading "inherits" the same prohibitions as the original possessor,
whether or not he uses the information for his own benefit. He is at
fault in not taking the information to the SEC even though he rea-
sonably believes that the SEC will again disregard the information
unless the occurrence of sales forces the agency's attention. Fourth,
the public's evaluation of the tippee as the hero of the situation does
not entitle him to the benefit of the doubt as to whether he was moti-
vated by hope of personal gain, or to an exercise of enforcement dis-
cretion in not pressing the case.
The Supreme Court sustained the SEC on only the first of these
points. As to the others, the Court administered a severe defeat to
the SEC,125 perhaps partly because it had flouted the view of the
Solicitor General, the Government's official advocate in the Supreme
123. Those who God wishes to destroy he first makes mad.
124. See supra text accompanying note 91.
125. Dirks v. SEC, 51 U.S.L.W. 5123 (U.S. July 1, 1983).
Court. The Court reiterated its view in Chiarella that trading on
nonpublic information was not wrong unless the trader owed a pre-
existing fiduciary duty to the opposite party. Applying this view to a
tippee, the court held that a tippee does not inherit the insider's inhi-
bition on trading unless the insider had motives of personal profit.
The SEC thereby suffered a huge setback to its program for restrict-
ing trading by tippees on inside information.
Detailed consideration of the Dirks case and the substantive law
of insider trading is not my principal purpose in this discussion. 12
The case certainly illustrates my view about unlawyerlike conduct,
for the SEC risked its gains over several years on a patently weak
case against a public hero, based on tenuous and novel theories. The
Commission left itself open to the interpretation that it was miffed
because it had not been handed the information to break the case.
My contention that the SEC was unstatesmanlike in sponsoring
the legislation it tendered against trading on nonpublic informa-
tion127 while Dirks was pending is supported as follows: The SEC's
and the United States' contentions in Chiarella and Dirks showed
that the extent of the prohibition on insider trading, especially as
applied to tippees, was uncertain. Chiarella and subsequent cases
left uncertainty as to whether the prohibition extended to market
information, when the trader allegedly breached a fiduciary duty to
a tender offeror. The validity of the SEC's Rule 14e-3 is doubtful in
light of Chiarella and the close similarity of sections 10(b) and
14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act.128 Yet, pleading the need for
haste as a reason for not seeking to clarify any of these matters in
the statutes, the SEC proposed a civil penalty equal to treble the
trader's profit for violation of the 1934 Act, "while in possession of
material nonpublic information. 1 2 9
The bill as drafted did not contain an exclusion of liability when a
"Chinese Wall"130 through which inside information does not pene-
trate is maintained between departments of a multidepartment in-
vestment banker and broker, even though that point had been cov-
ered in the SEC's Rule 14e-3. It does nothing to clarify the question
whether the prohibitions are violated by trading when information is
126. Dirks is discussed in Fogelson & Stein, supra note 97, and in Goelzer, infra
note 140.
127. H.R. 559, 98th CONG., 1st Sess. (1983).
128. See Fogelson & Stein, supra note 97.
129. Supra note 127.
130. On the "Chinese Wall," see Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to
the Conflict Problem of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 459 (1975); Chazen, Rein-
forcing a Chinese Wall: A Response, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 579 (1976); Lipton & Mazur,
The Chinese Wall: A Reply to Chazen, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 579 (1976); Herman &
Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust Department and the "Wall," 14 B. C. INDus. &
Com. L. REV. 21 (1972).
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possessed but not used.
Nor did the bills as originally submitted clarify an obvious ques-
tion suggested by prior cases and discussions 31 and by a recent SEC
contention 132-whether the trader's "profit" which may be tripled
under the bill's penalty is to be all of his profit on his transaction or
is to be limited to that portion of his profit which was possible be-
cause of the effect of the nondisclosure. For instance, the trader buys
a share of common stock for $1, and the price goes to $10 because of
the Arab oil embargo. The price would have fallen to $8 if the true
condition of the company's reserves had been reported, and did fall
to $8 after disclosure, but the trader, an insider, sold at $10 without
disclosing his knowledge of the necessary revision of the reserves. Is
his profit to be measured at $2 or at $9 for the purpose of tripling
it?1 33 The above problem is cured by the bill as amended in the
House of Representatives before passage. The revision provides:
(c) for purposes of this paragraph 'profit gained' or 'loss avoided' is the
difference between the purchase or sale price of the security and the value
of that security as measured by the trading price of the security a reasona-
ble period after public dissemination of the nonpublic information.
1 4
But a similar problem in reverse is not cured by the revision. For
example, the insider sells at $10, without disclosing a necessary revi-
sion of the reserves that would have reduced the price to $8, but
disclosure of the condition is not made for some time. General mar-
ket conditions cause the price to fall to $3 and then the announce-
ment about the reserves causes the price to fall to $1. Under the test
131. See Reder, Measuring Buyers' Damages in lOb-5 Cases, 31 Bus. LAW 1839
(1976); Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule l0b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded
Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371 (1974). On the mathematical technique involved in
separating out the effect of the non-disclosed facts, compare Benston, Required Disclos-
ure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63
Am. EcON. REV. 132, 137-41 (1933). Judge Weinstein used a less sophisticated tech-
nique in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Co., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Com-
pare § I 1 (e) of the Securities Act, which provides that a defendant otherwise liable for
faulty disclosure can defend by showing that a portion of the decline in value of the
security was caused by factors other than the non-disclosed information.
132. In SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc), the SEC ar-
gued that the defendant should be required to disgorge all of his profit when he had
bought on undisclosed inside information, even that profit made possible by appreciation
of the security after the information was publicly disclosed. The First Circuit en banc
rejected this theory.
133. This example is based on one in D. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION 532
(2d ed. 1980), which in turn is based on a dissenting opinion of Judge Sneed in Green v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976).
134. H.R. 559, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (as amended on Union Calendar
No. 221, Report No. 98-355, Sept. 15, 1983).
of H.R. 559 his liability (which could be tripled) would be $9, but
under the test of § 11 (e) of the Securities Act and the other authori-
ties cited in note 131 and in common sense, it should be $2.
Of course, the Bar and the financial community protested the bill,
and Chairman Shad admitted that the language was too broad.13
The bill was stalled until July 27, 1983, when a House subcommittee
approved it in modified form. The new form excludes brokers from
liability for executing a transaction for a person who has committed
a violation of law by trading on nonpublic information, and it con-
tains the imperfect limitation of damages discussed above. The
House passed the bill in its 1983 session. The amended bill does not
protect a broker or banker in the Chinese Wall situation.136
How could it have happened in the 1980's that the SEC would
introduce and continue to push a bill which did not meet the legiti-
mate needs of those affected?137 I have the greatest respect for the
present commissioners of the SEC. Why did they pursue Dirks and
sponsor such legislation? 13 8 The answer may be what I have called
the "bureaucratic momentum" of the staff. Commissioners and divi-
sion directors may change, but the momentum of the staff which
drafted the Order for Hearing in Dirks39 still persists, probably still
dreaming of complete equality of information in the marketplace,
and draconian penalties for those who trade while having an infor-
mational advantage.
Daniel L. Goelzer, Esq., the present General Counsel of the SEC,
has recently defended the Commission's failure to offer a definition
of the prohibited conduct on the ground that "the courts need to
retain the flexibility to respond to new types of fraud. 1 40 This has
135. Hudson, SEC's Shad Backs Brokerage Industry's Drive to Cut Scope of In-
sider-Trading Bill, Wall St. J., April 14, 1983, at 16, col. 3.
136. H.R. 559, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2 (1983) (as amended on Union Calendar
No. 221, Report No. 98-355, Sept. 15, 1983). The first session of the 98th Congress
adjourned without the Senate having taken any action on its own bill or on the bill as
passed by the House.
137. See notes 129-35.
138. I personally would have seen no objection to a properly limited bill; that is,
one authorizing a treble damage penalty in cases that were clearly prohibited under the
decided cases - trading by corporate insiders while in the possession of and using mate-
rial inside corporate information. I would not have objected to codifying the lower courts'
extension of penalties to trading tippees who understood the source of the information
and knew it was not public. While I believe that Chiarella was rightly decided under the
then-existing state of the law, I would have had no objection to legislation codifying Rule
14e-3 and thus prohibiting trading by a person using non-public information about a
tender offer. This was the proposal of Milton V. Freeman, Esq., an experienced SEC
lawyer, as a substitute for the SEC bill. See his testimony in Hearing on H.R. 559 before
the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1983).
139. See supra text accompanying note 102.
140. Goelzer, SEC General Counsel's Speech on Insider Trading, Legal Times,
Nov. 7, 1983, at 28, 30.
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always been the SEC's standard answer to protests about the SEC
making law through litigation (as criticized in former Commissioner
Karmel's book, Regulation by Prosecution""), instead of resorting to
rule-making or legislation. In my view, whatever may be the merit of
the SEC's position in connection with issues subject to standard pen-
alties, the threat of invoking the triple penalty gives the SEC and its
staff too great a power to exert pressure to force defendants into
consent decrees through which new far-out law would be made by
acquiescence. I have elsewhere discussed the SEC's practice in this
respect.," I am surprised that the current leaders of the SEC, in
whom I have confidence, have proposed it.143 It would have been
much more statesmanlike to accept a ninety to ninety-five percent
improvement of the deterrent situation (i.e., not to reach for triple
damages on applications of the inside trading doctrine that have not
been clarified by statutory definition or by adjudication). The triple
penalty authorization should be limited to the presently certain scope
of the doctrine plus whatever extensions Congress may be willing to
141. See note 6 and accompanying text.
142. Kripke, supra note 80, at 194-96.
143. An answer might be that persons in whom I have confidence would not abuse
the power. My reply would be that the SEC cannot always control the zealots on its staff,
as perhaps illustrated in the remainder of this note.
A current case is alleged to be a recurrence of the SEC's goal of the 1970's, which was
to police corporate morality generally, without the appropriate limits of relevance to the
securities legislation. Paradyne Corp. moved to dismiss a SEC injunction suit based on
allegedly fraudulent methods used by Paradyne to obtain a very large contract for com-
puters from the Social Security Administration. Paradyne charged that "the SEC's ac-
tion represents an unprecedented attempt to expand the jurisdiction of ... the SEC to
matters that are the proper concern of other statutes, other agencies." Wall St. J., April
15, 1983, at 10, col. 1. Market reaction to the SEC's charges indicates that the Social
Security Administration's reaction to established fraud might quantitatively be material
to the company's financial position and thus well within the SEC's concerns. But
Paradyne alleges that the Social Security Administration is satisfied with Paradyne's per-
formance of the contract, and that the SEC is trying to induce dissatisfaction. Wall St.
J., April 27, 1983, at 4, col. 2. See also Wall St. J., June 24, 1983, at 10, col. 1. Recently
one Social Security official gave lukewarm credence to the SEC's charges, Wall St. J.,
July 28, 1983, at 8, col. 2, but later said that an SEC official had dictated his statement.
Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1983, at 4, col. 2. More recently it was rumored that an SEC
Washington official had expressed doubt whether the regional office should have brought
the suit, and that the SEC would amend its complaint and submit a "fairly bland" ver-
sion preparatory to a settlement. Wall St. J., Sept. 13, 1983, at 5, col. I. But no settle-
ment has been announced.
Thus far Paradyne has won the publicity war in the Wall Street Journal and else-
where, but the SEC charges have materially injured Paradyne in its reputation and busi-
ness, and in the out-of-pocket costs of litigation. From the point of view of comfort with
securities regulation, one hopes that at the trial the SEC will justify itself by proving that
the damage to Paradyne was inherent in the situation but undisclosed in the company's
SEC filings.
enact, such as trading on nonpublic information about tender offers.
It is interesting to note that while Mr. Goelzer asserted that his
staff was unable, despite several drafts, to define insider trading for
purposes of the triple damages bill, the SEC accepted a very specific
and quite narrow definition for purposes of cooperation with the
Swiss on insider trading emanating from Switzerland into United
States markets.14 This narrow definition does not reach fact situa-
tions like Chiarella or Newman, relating to nonpublic information on
tender offers. No doubt the SEC has accepted this because its bar-
gaining power with the Swiss was not as great as it believes its bar-
gaining power to be with a compliant Congress. But John Fedders,
Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, referred to this as a
"landmark achievement."1
45
So, while I think the excesses of the 1970's are largely gone, some
excesses - exemplified by Dirks and the proposed legislation - may
still continue. There should be no more of them. After fifty years of
efforts to expand the Commission's present authority through "Reg-
ulation by Prosecution, "146 instead of a fair legislative or rule-mak-
ing process, the excesses should cease. New challenges relating to the
presently ongoing legislative and nonlegislative restructuring of the
financial community will take all of the energies of that community,
the Bar, the courts, and the Commission.
144. The definition of an insider contained in Convention XVI is as follows:
'a) a member of the board, an officer, an auditor or a mandated person of the
Company or an assistant of any of them; or b) a member of a public authority
or a public officer who in the execution of his public duty received information
about an Acquisition or a Business Combination or c) a person who on the basis
of information about an Acquisition or a Business Combination received from a
person described in . . . a) or b) above has been able to act for the latter or to
benefit himself from inside information.'
Remarks by John M. Fedders, Director, Division of Enforcement SEC, to Seminar on
Litigation of Business Matters in the U.S. and International Legal Assistance, Preserving
the Integrity of the Internationalized U.S. Capital Markets - Views on Methods by
which the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission May Seek Protection of Evidence,
n. 28 (Sept. 27, 1983, Zurich, Switzerland) (citing Agreement XVI, Art. 5 of a Memo-
randum of Understanding between the Swiss and United States governments printed in
Legal Times, Oct. 4, 1982, at 17, 19).
145. Fedders, supra note 144, at 16.
146. Supra text accompanying note 6.
